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Current perceptions of emerging rural environmental issues re-
flect an evolution.  Over the decades,  the key environmental ques-
tions asked by agricultural  economists  have  rotated from those
addressing  the impact  of natural resources  use,  price  and policy  on
farmers' welfare  to those addressing  the impact of various human
activities,  including  agricultural  and  forestal  practices,  on  environ-
mental quality and human health.
Encompassed  in today's research issues are also the impact  of po-
tential technological-including  biotechnological-innovations,
changing  ownership patterns  and environmental  and agricultural
legislation on natural resource quantity and quality, as well as the
net benefits  offered  by integrated  pest management  and alternative
agriculture.  Indeed, there  is probably  a legitimate  argument that
there  has been neglect  of the more traditional  profit-oriented  re-
search  questions  such as the impact of environmental  legislation  on
the competitive  position  of various  agricultural  sectors or regions
with one another or with other trading nations.
Emerging Rural Environmental Issues
While not intended  to be an exhaustive  list of rural environmental
problems,  Table  1 presents nine  major issues.  Some represent  con-
cerns that  are decades  old such  as  irrigation,  grazing  and  soil pro-
ductivity.  Others  are  emerging  issues  including  ground  water  con-
tamination,  global warming,  food safety and occupational health.
However,  the  real emerging  environmental  issues  are the  chang-
ing perceptions  about the age old question,  "who has the right to do
what to whom?",  with respect to natural resources.  Or, more specifi-
cally:
*  What  are  appropriate  management  goals  for  natural  resourc-
es? How safe is safe?  How clean  is clean?  How should  conflicting
uses be resolved?  How  should we handle uncertainties  with respect
to future conditions?
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1.  Forest and Range Management
*  Quantity and Quality
*  Alternative,  Conflicting Uses
*  Forest and Grassland Reserves
*  Severance  Taxes and Grazing Fees
2.  Soil Conservation
*  Soil Quantity and Quality
*  Off-site  Impacts of Sediment Transport
3.  Mineral  Management
*  Conflicts with Other Land Uses
*  Reclamation  and Pollution
*  Mineral  Reserves
*  Severance  Taxes
4.  Water
*  Surface  and Ground Quantity and Quality
(Chemicals,  Toxins,  and Salinity)
*  Irrigation Supply and Price
*  Conflicts between  Users and Uses
5.  Recreation
*  Access
*  Quality  and Quantity
*  Conflicts between Users
*  User  Fees
6.  Land  Use
*  Urbanization  Conflicts
*  Waste Disposal
*  Biomass Production
*  Farm and Non-farm Conflicts
7.  Human Health
*  Pesticide Residues
*  Antibiotics in Animal Products
*  Occupational  Health
*  Release of New Genetic Materials
8.  Protection  of Unique  Species or Habitat
*  Wetlands
*  Coastal Areas
*  Endangered  Species
*  Wildlife Protection and Biological Diversity
*  Development Preservation Conflicts
9.  Climate
*  Air Pollution
*  Global Warming
*  Acid Rain
*  Management  for the Extreme Event
*  What is the appropriate  role of the government  in protecting
environmental  quality,  resource  quantity  and  access  to  natural  re-
sources?  What  is the  role among  federal,  state and local  govern-
ments? What  is the role  among agencies  at various  governmental
levels?
*  Who should bear the costs  of any management  strategies?
What mechanism should be used for financing?  Who has the right to
benefits of any management  strategy?
126*  Who  decides?
New  answers are emerging  to these questions  and they are redefin-
ing property rights to rural natural resources.
Management  Goals
The evidence  is unrefutable  that Americans  desire  a clean and
safe  environment.  There  is also reasonably  clear evidence  that the
public is  willing to pay to  assure a reasonably  safe and clean  en-
vironment.  However,  beyond these general  statements,  lie some
murky interpretations.
For example,  our ability to detect agricultural contamination of
ground  water vastly exceeds  our ability to understand the signifi-
cance of our findings.  There  is much  scientific  controversy  over the
association between low levels of pesticides in ground water and ad-
verse health effects (Evans; Blair,  Cantor and Zahm).  But the scien-
tific controversy  is not the concern of the general public which is  de-
manding  a high level of protection from involuntary risks such as
those  that attend the drinking of contaminated  water. Yet,  zero de-
gration  is probably  impossible  (given  our ever  increasing  ability  to
measure  increasing  dilute concentrations)  and most  assuredly ex-
pensive.  The questions,  "How  clean  is clean?"  and "How  safe  is
safe?",  thus also  implicitly include the  additional question,  "How
much are we willing to pay to reduce risk even when we do not have
information as to what is the current level of risk?"
There are those who  argue, for example,  that anyone who wishes
to control agricultural chemical  use  must be  forced to prove  con-
clusively  that the  chemical  is dangerous  (Rice).  In contrast,  others
argue the burden of proof should be on those who stand to profit
from the use of the chemical.  Not only is this a debate as to who has
the property  rights to chemical  use and the use  of the environment
to receive  chemicals,  statisticians will note that this is the issue of
whether society  chooses to reduce Type I or Type II errors.  That is,
do we want to reduce the possibility  of Type I errors-allowing a
chemical to be used under the supposition that it is not harmful to
humans and  wildlife  only to find our supposition  proven wrong?  Or
conversely,  do we want to reduce the possibility  of Type  II errors-
unnecessarily  banning  a chemical that,  in fact,  is harmless  and thus
foregoing the benefits  it could have given us?  Since reduction  of one
type  of error increases the occurrence  of the other, the  choices  are
neither easy nor clear.
Ground  water is just one  of the  environmental issues that may
bring major readjustments which are long term,  nonincremental and
that  can  involve  uncertain  and  perhaps  irreversible  consequences.
Because  of many technological  innovations that have been widely
adopted since the post World War  II period,  society has been forced
to manage externalities that are far less tractable than the more  con-
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source effluent pollution.  These externalities include those attending
the  disposal  of toxic  wastes,  ozone  depletion,  or  the  so-called
"greenhouse"  effect of global warming.
We have limited experience  with the nature  of these  externalities;
intelligent apprehension  exists over the possible damages  caused by
them on this and future generations  (Mishan  and Page).  Page refers
particularly  to  the  "zero-infinity"  dilemma-externalities  that  pose
low probabilities  of catastrophic  outcomes.  But there is no such thing
as a free lunch and society  will have to decide  how much insurance
it wants to buy to reduce uncertain risks.
Should we as  a society, for example,  require or subsidize  vast re-
forestation here and abroad  in the pursuit  of improved  environmen-
tal  quality and reduced air pollution-with the  possible,  but not cer-
tain,  payback  of reduction  in  global warming?  Such  a strategy
requires  large  amounts  of resources  and  perhaps  loss  of individual
freedom for an uncertain  payback;  yet the costs of not adopting the
strategy could  conceivably  also be quite high.  Or, for another exam-
ple, do  we ban toxic waste generation,  require recycling  or try to
dispose of such wastes  by burying, burning or dumping? Each "solu-
tion"  has its own costs.
The  Role  of Government
There are  strong philosophical  differences  in perceptions  about
the appropriate  role  of the government  in managing  rural environ-
mental  issues.  The role  of the  private  market  or  voluntary  com-
pliance  to  achieve  proposed  environmental  protection  goals  are
championed  for several environmental  issues.
For example,  at one  time,  particularly in Western  states,  the  fed-
eral government  was very heavily  involved  in the  provision of water
resources.  As  the  federal  presence  has diminished,  states have  be-
come  more  active  in redefining  their water allocation  laws  (Cum-
mings).
The rediscovery  of water law has lead to reexamination  of the po-
tential role of private markets and prices to allocate water-so-called
privatization of water rights-and to the design of new institutions  to
enhance  water  marketing,  according  to Frederick.  He  points out
that those in support of private markets emphasize  the shortcomings
of centralized  controls;  they argue that well-defined,  transferable
property rights  are essential  for  establishing  markets  to improve
water  use  (Frederick).  "Very  different  conclusions  are  reached  by
those  emphasizing  the  deficiencies  of markets  for allocating  water.
These people  say that not only  must there be well-defined  property
rights,  but that individuals must face the full costs as well as the ben-
efits  of their use or exchange  of the resource  if markets are  to work
effectively"  (Frederick,  p.  10).  Those in opposition  to water market-
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problems  not well handled by markets.
Discussing  environmental  problems also  includes  elements of pri-
vate versus  public solutions.  If Best Management  Practices are
viewed  as  important  to reduce pollutant  loadings,  should voluntary
compliance  (vrith or without cost sharing)  be relied on and should
farmers  be provided  with appropriate  education?  This argument
holds that farmers'  and society's  interests can converge  with appro-
priate information-based  programs (Abdalla and Libby).  Similarly
one could argue that private market responses alone  could assure
the level of environmental quality desired-at least where market
goods such as food  products  are concerned.  For example,  H.J.
Heinz and Company  is one of several food processors that have noti-
fied producers  to  reduce  chemical  residues  or find other  buyers
(Taylor and  Meier).  Will consumer purchase  decisions  be  adequate
stimuli to provide a food supply that is deemed safe?
For some  rural  environmental  issues  the private,  voluntary  solu-
tion has  proven dominant.  In addition  to water marketing  cases,
many  land use  strategies rely  on public  incentives  within  a  market
context.  Examples  include use value assessment,  scenic easement
purchases  and purchases of development  rights.
In many perceived  environmental  problems,  however,  the answer
has been to reject the private  or voluntary  solution and substitute a
regulatory approach.  With this view,  farmers'  and society's interests
cannot converge  with voluntary programs  (Abdalla  and Libby).
Under  the "polluter  pays"  principle,  regulation,  not  cost sharing,  is
required.
Mishan  and Page reject,  in particular,  the idea that consumer de-
cision  will  lead  to attainment  of societal  interests  because,  they  ar-
gue, consumer decisions are based on a foundation of ignorance:
Further,  inasmuch  as the untoward  consequences  of consumer
innovations-including  food  additives,  chemical  drugs  and
pesticides,  synthetic materials  and a variety  of new gadgets-
tend to unfold slowly  over time,  their valuations by market
prices may bear no  relation whatever  to the net utilities  con-
ferred over time.  Indeed,  the very pace of change today with re-
spect to new models and new goods is such that is it is not possi-
ble  for the  buying public  to learn from  its own experience  to
assess the relative merits of a large proportion of the goods com-
ing into the market (Mishan and Page,  p.  123).
There  is also the argument that any societal benefits  should be ac-
companied by societal responsibilities.  Thus, the argument proceeds
that it is only equitable,  for  example, that farmers'  rights to subsi-
dized  irrigation water or farm  bill deficiency  payments  should be
contingent on good stewardship.
129In addition to the debate  about the regulatory  nature  of proposed
public  actions,  there  is also  a debate  about whether state  or federal
governments  should  take  the  lead.  In  ground  water  protection,  for
example,  one can marshal arguments  to justify a federal  role:  the
need  for  coordination;  uniformity  across  state  and  regional  bound-
aries;  and,  the  trans-state  boundary  nature  of many  contamination
problems.  However,  because  of the  diversity  of state  ground water
problems;  the  historical  dominance  of states  in  land use issues;  and
because of the vacuum  produced by the lack  of federal responses to
early  detection  of contaminated  ground  water,  many  states are  ini-
tiating their own programs (Batie, 1988a).
With respect to ground water, there remain disputes  over whether
federal  or state  agencies  should take the lead.  For example,  should
the United States Department  of Agriculture have  a larger role in
the protection  of  ground  water  from  contamination  by  agricultural
chemicals?  Should  the Department  of Interior?  Or  is ground water
management  strictly  a matter for the Environmental  Protection
Agency?  Are  these  agencies  necessarily  adversaries?  Similarly,  in
many  states,  pesticide  regulation  has  historically  been  a function  of
State Departments  of Agriculture.  However,  because  the original
task of the regulation was to protect the farmer from fraud and to as-
sure  certification  of pesticide  applicators,  the  regulatory  personnel
were not well positioned or in  many cases disposed to broaden their
view  of their mission to that of protecting the environment.  Thus,
several states have removed  pesticide  regulation  from their Depart-
ments of Agriculture  and placed them in Departments  of Environ-
mental Protection, Water Quality  or Public Health.
The Costs and the Benefits
The answers  to the two  questions,  "What  are the  management
goals?"  and  "What  is the role  of government?",  will determine  who
will bear the costs and who will reap the benefits of any use of natu-
ral resources.  Nevertheless,  it seems prudent to  raise the issue  as a
separate  one because  of its pivotal nature  in the  politics  of environ-
mental legislation.
If society  uses  conservation  reserve  programs  to  obtain environ-
mental benefits,  society foregoes  whatever service the land would
have  provided otherwise.  In addition,  society foregoes the  oppor-
tunity  to use the rental  payment expenses  in  a different  way.  If we
allow hay cutting on conservation  reserve program lands,  farmers
have  gained, but we forego  some of the wildlife benefits we could
have  obtained.  Different  groups are affected  and different  oppor-
tunity costs are accrued if we do not ration access to Yosemite Park;
if we ration on a first come,  first served basis; or if we ration with re-
servations.  If forest companies  pay  full and actual costs for access  to
public  timber  stands  we  would  expect  to see different  consumer
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comes than if we subsidized such cutting.
The question of who bears the opportunity  costs can be clearly  il-
lustrated with ground water examples.  Some states such as Connect-
icut have experimented  with a policy of strict liability which make
the polluter  responsible for damages-no matter how much care was
exercised.  Other  states such  as  California  shy  away from  strict  lia-
bility but regulate  chemical use (Batie,  1988a).
Costs must  also  include  out-of-pocket,  administrative  costs  for im-
plementation.  More policies are adding in user fees or taxes to assist
in meeting these costs.  Some states,  such as  Iowa,  have fertilizer
taxes.  The tax is not necessarily  levied to change farmers'  use of fer-
tilizer but to raise  funds to research  alternative agriculture  strat-
egies. Many states including  Virginia raised the taxes on nonfarm
citizens to pay for the use value assessment  given to farmers.
Who  Decides?
The question of who decides is,  at least in the abstract, already an-
swered in the United  States by the participatory  democracy form  of
government.  Generally,  when a problem  is defined,  groups become
interested  in  its resolution.  "[T]here  are,  in each  issue area,  policy
communities  made  up  of specialists,  each  with their  own set  of
proposals.  The specialists may be members of interest groups,  agen-
cies, universities,  think tanks  ..  ." (Rushefsky,  p. 62).  Together they
form what can be termed a  "policy community"  (Kingdom).  They
generate  proposals  and  those  that  survive  are  technically  feasible,
compatible with the values of many of the policy specialists,  and pro-
moted by individual  "policy  entrepreneurs"-people  who invest re-
sources to further  their preferred  policy.  The values  reflected  by
successful proposals include,  not  only notions of the  proper role and
size of government,  but also concepts  of equity and efficiency;  they
reflect budget constraints  as well as the "national mood"  (Kingdom).
When windows  of opportunities  open to the policy community be-
cause of elections,  ideological  changes in Congress, the White House
Administration,  state  legislatures,  or because of external events,  the
policy community  attempts to get their various proposals enacted.
Furthermore,  in the  politics  that characterize  participatory  democ-
racy,  perceptions  are  reality  and  questions  of equity  are  more
important than questions of efficiency.
In environmental  issues, at least at the federal level, there exists a
strong, relatively  well-organized  policy community that attends to
environmental  issues.  The  environmentalists  of this  community  use
both the legislative process  and the court system to obtain their goals
and they  tend  to see  themselves  as  representing  society's  interests
and desires for a safe and high-quality environment.
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My perceptions on the four emerging trends-particularly  in refer-
ence to the less tractable environmental  problems such as ground
water  contamination,  global  warming,  disposal  of wastes,  chemical
residual in food and acid rain-are as follows.
With respect  to the  appropriate  goals for  managing natural  re-
sources,  there appears  to  be an increasing  willingness  to err on the
"safe side."  That is,  society is more willing to risk a Type II error
than a Type I.  Society is willing to restrict the use of some natural
resource  services,  such  as the  ability to  receive  and assimilate  agri-
chemicals,  and relinquish the benefits from using the chemical,  even
when there  is a chance  there will be no reduction  of health or envi-
ronmental  quality  risks.  The  willingness  to reduce  chlorofluorocar-
bons because of the probability they are damaging the ozone layer is
just one set of evidence  of this increasing willingness to buy insur-
ance against uncertain but potential events endangering health or
the  environment.
With  respect  to the appropriate  role  of government,  I believe  the
trend is  to more  "top-down,"  regulatory  type actions.  When the fed-
eral government has  failed to enact  restrictive  policies,  the states
have increasingly substituted their own.  Increasingly  the  agency as-
signed responsibility for managing natural resource quality has been
an environmentally-oriented  agency,  neither  production  nor eco-
nomic development  agencies.
With respect to the incidence  of costs and  benefits of any public
action, more  costs are being borne by the landowner,  and, thus, ulti-
mately  by the consumer  of the natural resource products.  It is inter-
esting to note,  for example,  that even though polls consistently  show
strong  public support  for the  farmer,  as well  as the  need to  protect
the family  farm,  respondents  condition  these  attitudes  by their per-
ceived  responsibility  of farmers  to  protect  natural resources  (Batie,
1988b).  There also appears to be more effort to include revenue gen-
eration components  such as user fees in any legislation to provide
self-financing  for public action.  Increasingly,  beneficiaries  are those
who desire higher protection  of environmental  quality.
With respect to the issue of "who decides,"  I have been impressed
with the growth  and  increasing  sophistication  of environmental  ad-
vocates,  particularly  at the federal  level.  The members  of the  com-
munity include  the  Audubon  Society,  the Natural  Resources  De-
fense  Council,  The  National  Coalition  Against  the  Misuse  of
Pesticides,  the Sierra Club, The Conservation  Foundation and many
other groups.  They consistently have been key players  in legislation
affecting natural resource use and have managed to keep opponents
of their  agenda  on the defensive  for much  of the  time.  While  mem-
bers of the broader  policy community  on environmental  issues in-
clude advocates  for the continued pattern  on use of natural resourc-
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interest  groups that describe themselves  as objective participants
(e.g.,  The  League  of Women  Voters  or academics),  the  community
itself has vastly increased the numbers  of environmental  quality ad-
vocates  particularly  within  the last decade.  They are broadening
their vision  as to what issues concern them; many are seeking inno-
vative coalitions;  and they will have a voice in the decisions  made
with respect to rural natural resource use.
Implications  for Policy  Education
I believe  the challenge  for policy educators has never been great-
er.  Clientele  groups  have  expanded  beyond  the traditional  farmer,
rancher and forester,  to include,  not only other rural citizens,  but
other groups interested  in rural welfare  and rural environmental
quality.  The expertise  needed by the  policy educator  has expanded
beyond farm management  skills or farm policy knowledge to include
natural resource  economics  and rural development  economics  as
well as knowledge  of the legislation that addresses  rural environ-
mental and development  concerns.  The need  for  assistance  from
other disciplines transcends that from production departments  to bi-
ology,  climatology,  geology,  law, political  science,  sociology and  hy-
drology.  Deterministic  planning  must  yield  to  adaptive  planning
more appropriate  to the uncertain and stochastic world of today.
To repeat,  the challenge to the policy  educator has  never been
greater.
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